Cameroon's Debt Trap: How 900 Billion FCFA Became 15,600 Billion, According to an Ex-IMF Insider

Eugène Nyambal interviewed on Fauteuil Rouge TV, 28 September 2026 (in French). The quotations below are taken from this interview.

Twenty years ago, Cameroon was handed a rare second chance: most of its external debt was written off. Today its public-sector debt stands at 15,607 billion FCFA, or 44.2% of GDP, according to the national debt agency, the Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement (CAA). How did a country that emerged from debt relief with a clean slate end up back in the trap? Eugène Nyambal, a Cameroonian economist who was a mission chief at the World Bank, sat on the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund for African countries and worked on HIPC debt relief from the inside, gave a blunt answer in a long interview with Fauteuil Rouge TV.

This is the first article in our series on his diagnosis of Cameroon's economy. It covers debt, the IMF, and why the next crisis cannot be solved the way the last one was.

The fiscal space that HIPC opened, and how it closed

Nyambal places Cameroon under structural adjustment for roughly two decades, from the mid-1980s until debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, whose completion point Cameroon reached on 1 May 2006. By the end of that process, and after the multilateral relief that followed, the public debt had fallen to around 900 billion FCFA, a level usually dated to 2008–09.

Relief freed money that had been going to creditors every year. Nyambal estimates that about 550 billion FCFA a year in debt service was released. Where did it go? He says it fed what Cameroonians know as budget "lines 65 and 94", headings for common and miscellaneous expenditure, rather than a clear investment strategy. Combined with high oil prices after 2006, he argues, the windfall encouraged "irresponsible investment programmes", and by 2017 the State was struggling to meet its obligations.

« On est passé d'une dette de 900 milliards en 2006, on a plus de 15 000 milliards aujourd'hui. »

"We went from a debt of 900 billion in 2006 to more than 15,000 billion today." (our translation)

— Eugène Nyambal, former member of the IMF Executive Board. Fauteuil Rouge TV, 28 September 2026

The broad arc is confirmed by official data, with one nuance on timing: the 900-billion figure reflects the position a few years after the 2006 completion point, once all relief had been applied. The latest CAA bulletins show 15,416 billion FCFA at 31 March 2026 and 15,607 billion at 30 June 2026.

Nyambal adds a rough calculation of his own. With budgets of around 5,000 billion FCFA a year over a decade, plus the new debt, he puts total spending at something like 65,000 billion. "Does Cameroon look like a country where 50,000 billion has been spent?" he asks. In his view, much of the borrowing went into waste, badly designed infrastructure and corruption. These are his assessments; they are not the findings of any audit cited in the interview.

The IMF: "not a development organisation"

Coming from a former member of its Board, Nyambal's description of the Fund is striking. He insists the IMF was never designed to develop countries. Its role in a debt crisis, he says, is to make sure creditors are paid.

« Au niveau de la gestion de la dette, le FMI est un peu comme l'huissier des créanciers, des pays riches. »

"When it comes to managing debt, the IMF is a bit like the bailiff of the creditors, of the rich countries." (our translation)

— Eugène Nyambal. Fauteuil Rouge TV, 28 September 2026

He describes the classic adjustment sequence: raise taxes and customs duties, cut spending on health, education and infrastructure to generate a surplus that repays external debt, then privatise, "selling the family silver". His principle is simple: "A debt that does not help generate growth and create wealth is unacceptable."

Yet he does not put the main blame on Washington. He holds the Cameroonian government "80% responsible" for the situation and the IMF for the rest, and he warns that "even an IMF programme will not solve any problem" on its own.

Borrowing in dollars to pay in CFA

The sharpest part of his critique concerns how Cameroon borrows. In finance, he says, you do not borrow in foreign currency to fund domestic spending in CFA francs, such as operating costs, domestic arrears or a hotel in Yaoundé. Hard-currency debt, in his view, should be reserved for sectors that earn hard currency, such as oil and gas.

He also says the price is too high. In the interview he cites Eurobond rates of 11–12%. The official record is lower, but the gap he points to is real. Cameroon's July 2024 dollar Eurobond, a 550-million-dollar seven-year issue, priced at 10.75%. Its early-2026 issue, 750 million dollars due 2033, carried an 8.875% coupon and a 10.125% yield. Côte d'Ivoire, by contrast, priced a 15-year bond on 18 February 2026 at 5.39% on a euro-hedged basis, and Benin's recent tranches carry coupons of roughly 4.9–6.2%.

« Est-ce que vous pouvez avoir un crédit de votre banque à 3 % et aller emprunter auprès d'une microfinance à 25 % ? »

"Would you take a loan from your bank at 3% and then go and borrow from a microfinance lender at 25%?" (our translation)

— Eugène Nyambal. Fauteuil Rouge TV, 28 September 2026

5,000 billion FCFA waiting to be spent

His analogy targets a paradox that official data confirm. While Cameroon raises expensive market debt, billions in cheaper, mostly concessional loans sit unused. Committed but undisbursed loans stood at 5,044.6 billion FCFA at 31 March 2026. At 30 September 2025, counting loans authorised but not yet signed, the figure was 5,641.9 billion. Reports on the backlog point to missing counterpart funds and weak absorption capacity. Nyambal calls it a problem of "project maturation": projects are not prepared well enough to draw the money.

The same weakness shows up in the investment budget. The 2025 public investment budget was 1,863.1 billion FCFA out of a total budget of 7,317.7 billion, about 25%, as Nyambal says. He goes further, saying it is "not even executed at 50%". The planning ministry's official figures are higher: 64.15% physical execution for 2025, with a 56.9% disbursement rate on externally financed projects. Even on the official numbers, more than a third of planned investment was not delivered.

Cost is the other problem. Nyambal says other countries build three to six schools, hospitals or roads for the price of one in Cameroon. Reported World Bank work supports this for roads only, at two to six times comparable African costs.

Why this debt cannot be cancelled

For Nyambal, the most dangerous change since 2006 is who Cameroon now owes. HIPC worked because the creditors were mostly governments and multilateral lenders, which could agree to write off their claims. Today's debt includes Eurobonds held by private investors and pension funds. They have no mandate to forgive, and restructuring them is long, costly and damaging to a country's market access.

« Les impôts futurs, le sous-sol sont la garantie des emprunts. »

"Future taxes and the subsoil are the collateral for the loans." (our translation)

— Eugène Nyambal. Fauteuil Rouge TV, 28 September 2026

"The State never goes bankrupt," he notes, "as long as there are taxpayers." A country that stops paying, he warns, finds "every window in the world closed" to it. The cost of today's borrowing therefore falls on future budgets and future generations. "We are mortgaging our children's future," he says.

His prescription: one programme to prepare the exit

Nyambal does not call for walking away from the IMF. He proposes the opposite of permanent dependence: one final programme, designed from the start to prepare the country's exit from successive programmes.

« Si j'avais des responsabilités au Cameroun aujourd'hui, je préparerais mon pays à sortir de tous ces programmes… sortir de la dépendance et de l'esprit de dépendance. »

"If I had responsibilities in Cameroon today, I would prepare my country to leave all these programmes… to leave dependence, and the mindset of dependence." (our translation)

— Eugène Nyambal. Fauteuil Rouge TV, 28 September 2026

At the core is what he calls a "restructuring of public-finance management": no new foreign-currency loans for CFA spending, investment projects prepared before they are financed, full use of the concessional money already committed, and an end to opening a new loan decree for every new sector. Borrowing, in his framework, is justified only if it creates the wealth to repay it.

What it means for investors

Sovereign risk. At 44.2% of GDP, Cameroon's debt ratio is not extreme by regional standards, but the ratio is less important than its composition. A growing share of commercial, foreign-currency debt raises refinancing and currency risk, and makes any future restructuring harder, which is exactly Nyambal's point.

Eurobond pricing. The market already charges Cameroon a premium: yields of around 10–10.75% on recent dollar issues, roughly double Côte d'Ivoire's hedged euro pricing in 2026. The 2026 issue was paired with a dollar-to-euro currency swap, which reduces exposure to the dollar but not the cost of the risk premium. Narrowing that spread would require visible improvements in budget execution and transparency.

Arrears. Domestic arrears affect contractors and suppliers directly, and payment delays on large projects, such as the Nachtigal hydropower plant, are a signal worth watching for anyone selling to the State. The undisbursed pipeline of more than 5,000 billion FCFA is also an opportunity: if absorption improves, it represents a large volume of already-financed contracts.

IMF programme status. Cameroon's last IMF programme (ECF/EFF) ended in July 2025. The IMF Board concluded the 2026 Article IV consultation on 30 March 2026, and on 17 March 2026 Cameroon committed, alongside its CEMAC peers, to seeking a new programme. It is under negotiation, not approved, and reports now point to 2027. Until then, budget support from multilateral partners is limited, which puts pressure on financing, and the terms of the next programme will be a key signal for bondholders.

Conclusion

Cameroon did not fall back into debt because it was denied relief. It fell back, in Nyambal's telling, because the fiscal space won after HIPC was spent without a strategy, and the gap was then filled with some of the most expensive borrowing in the region. The official data support the main lines of that story: the debt stock has multiplied, market borrowing costs about 10%, and thousands of billions in cheaper loans sit unused. His conclusion is that no new IMF programme will fix this unless Cameroon changes how it prepares, finances and executes public spending. With today's creditors, there may not be another write-off.

Sources: interview with Eugène Nyambal, Fauteuil Rouge TV, 28 September 2026; CAA, monthly public debt bulletin, March 2026; News du Camer (debt at 30 June 2026); AfDB, HIPC completion point document; IMF, 2026 Article IV press release; Business in Cameroon (new IMF programme); Ecofin Agency (2024 Eurobond); Cygnum Capital (2026 Eurobond and swap); Bloomberg (Côte d'Ivoire Eurobond); Investir au Cameroun (undisbursed loans); News du Camer (5,044 billion undisbursed); MINEPAT, BIP 2025 execution; Le Jour (2025 budget); Agence Ecofin (road costs); Agence Ecofin (Nachtigal arrears). Statements of opinion are those of the interviewee.

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